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Abstract This paper compares four cases and explores the effects on network
performance of network governance, coordination mechanisms, and the abilities of
the network manager. The focus is on shared-governance networks, which are in
general considered to have difficulties achieving high-level performances. The
cross-case comparison suggests a relationship between coordination mechanisms
and the way shared-governance networks are managed: in order to be successful,
they must be able to rely on formalized mechanisms and make a pool of ‘‘network
administrators’’ responsible for their governance.
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Collaboration
1 Introduction
Scholars only started focusing on network governance methods and exploring their
relationships with network performance relatively recently. It was in 2008 that the
well-known article ‘‘Modes of network governance. Structures, management and
D. Cristofoli (&)  J. Markovic
Faculty of Economics, Universita` della Svizzera Italiana, Lugano, Switzerland
e-mail: daniela.cristofoli@usi.ch
J. Markovic
e-mail: josip.markovic@usi.ch
M. Meneguzzo
Department of Business, Government and Philosophy, University of Rome Tor Vergata, Rome, Italy
e-mail: meneguzzo@economia.uniroma2.it
M. Meneguzzo
Faculty of Economics, Universita` della Svizzera Italiana, Lugano, Switzerland
123
J Manag Gov (2014) 18:77–93
DOI 10.1007/s10997-012-9237-2
effectiveness’’ by Provan and Kenis (2008) identified three different forms of
network governance: Shared/Participant governance, Lead Organization governance
and Network Administrative Organization (NAO) governance. In a subsequent
article, the authors looked in more detail into the relationships between these
governance forms and network performance, arguing that the appropriateness and
success of different governance forms can vary in different circumstances (Kenis
and Provan 2009). Shared-governance forms in particular are normally considered
to have difficulties achieving high-level performances. They are only expected to
work well in small, geographically concentrated networks where full, active face-to-
face interaction between network members is possible (Kenis and Provan 2009).
Our paper aims to contribute to the literature on the topic. Following the lead of
Kenis and Provan (2009), it will focus on shared-governance networks and examine
the key factors in making them successful. ‘‘How to be successful in shared-
governance networks’’ is the central research issue in our study.
We took the literature on service-delivery networks as our theoretical framework
(Turrini et al. 2010) and identified two categories of predictors of network
performance: network-coordination mechanisms and the abilities of the network
manager. We then explored whether coordination mechanisms and managerial
abilities, or a combination of them, can lead to success for shared-governance
networks.
Public homecare-assistance networks in Switzerland provided the empirical
setting for our study. In keeping with the purposes of our analysis, we conducted a
multiple case study based on four networks with shared governance.
The study results show that when many players are involved in network
governance, good performances are only possible if a well-defined set of rules and
procedures are supervised by a group of network ‘‘administrators’’ (as better defined
later).
Our study makes contributions on both a theoretical and a managerial level. In
theoretical terms, firstly it explores the relationship between network success and
different governance structures. The results show that coordination mechanisms and
managerial abilities do play a crucial part in the success of shared governance
network, regardless of circumstances like network size and geographical concen-
tration. Secondly, our study follows the direction suggested by Turrini et al. (2010)
and sheds light on the effects of interaction among the predictors of the network
performance. The results allow us to suppose that interaction between coordination
mechanisms and managerial abilities leads to network success. Thirdly, our study
complements the existing studies on the roles and abilities of the network manager.
The results reveal that in some circumstances, network success may not be reliant
on a network manager, or perhaps a different role and managerial abilities more
similar to those of an impartial administrator might be preferable. Fourthly, our
paper casts new light on the management-bureaucracy dichotomy in public
networks. The results seem to suggest that as network governance becomes more
complex and the degree of sharing among multiple players increases, it becomes
more and more preferable to comply with existing rules and procedures
administered by impartial institutional bodies. From a managerial point of view,
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the results of our study seem, thus, to suggest that administering shared-governance
networks in a bureaucratic way is one of the keys to making them successful.
The paper is divided into four sections. The first one gives an overview of
network governance methods and discusses the peculiarities of shared-governance
networks. The second section reviews the concepts of coordination mechanisms and
managerial abilities and presents the theoretical framework of the paper. The third
section describes the study method and presents the empirical setting. The last
section describes and discusses the results of the study.
2 Methods of network governance
In a number of articles in 2008 and 2009, Provan and Kenis (2008) and Kenis and
Provan (2009) began to shift their focus from the structural characteristics of public
networks (Provan and Milward 1995; Provan and Sebastian 1998; Provan et al.
2005) towards the distribution of governance power within the network structures,
while showing that different network-governance configurations can give different
results in terms of network performance.
The simplest governance form that a network can take is joint governance by the
participants. These shared-governance networks (or participant-governed networks)
consist of multiple organizations that work collectively as a network (without any
distinct governance entity), making all of the decisions and managing network
activities by themselves. The strength of these networks lies in the involvement of
all network partners and in their flexibility and responsiveness to the needs of the
network participants. However, a structure of this kind has a negative impact on
network efficiency (ibid.). Accordingly, it is more appropriate in small, geograph-
ically concentrated networks where full, active face-to-face interaction between
network members is possible.
The second network form, the Lead Organization-governed network, is based on
the coordination of activities and key decisions by a Lead Organization. This
organization provides administration for the network and facilitates the work of
partner organizations as they seek to achieve network goals (ibid.). The advantages
of this model lie in increased efficiency through easier coordination of network
activities and the legitimacy provided by the Lead Organization (ibid.). The
weakness is that the Lead Organizations often have their own agenda. This can
create tension between the Lead Organization and network partners due to their
different organizational interests (ibid.). This model is common in vertical
relationships between buyers and suppliers or between funders and recipients. It
can also occur in horizontal multilateral networks, most often when one key
organization has sufficient resources and legitimacy to play a leading role.
The third network form is the NAO model. It is based on the idea of a separate
administrative entity which manages and coordinates the network and its activities
just like a Lead Organization, but without being a network partner. Instead, it
provides its services to the network clients. This structure allows network
organizations to interact and work together while the main activities and key
decisions are coordinated by a separate, independent entity (Kenis and Provan
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2009). The NAO, which can be a government entity or a non-profit organization,
will be established with the express purpose of governing the network. These
organizations may have relatively informal structures revolving around single
individuals who act as network facilitators or brokers, or they may be more
formalized and complex organizations with a board and a management team.
According to Kenis and Provan (2009), the second, more formalized approach is
very likely to be used when the NAO is seeking official recognition to boost its
legitimacy among internal and external stakeholders (ibid.). The strengths of this
governance model are its greater legitimacy, sustainability and efficiency, while its
weakness lies in its bureaucratic decision-making process (ibid.). NAO governance
forms tend to be more suitable for large, highly complex networks.
The abovementioned considerations make it seem apparent that shared-gover-
nance networks are the simplest governance form, but they appear to have more
difficulties achieving high-level performances. ‘‘How to be successful in shared-
governance networks’’ is the research issue that we will try to address.
3 Theoretical framework
The existing literature provides us with a number of predictors of network
performance, ranging from the mechanisms for the coordination of the network
partners, to the abilities that the network manager must have in order to run the
network successfully. According to some authors (for example, see Turrini et al.
2010), it seems likely that these factors can have a joint effect on network
performance. In the following section, we will review the existing studies on
coordination mechanisms and the abilities of the network managers in successful
networks, while also presenting the theoretical framework behind our study
(Fig. 1).
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Fig. 1 Theoretical framework
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3.1 Coordination mechanisms in successful networks
Many studies have shown that network performance can be boosted by formalized
coordination mechanisms such as: joint information and communication systems;
shared marketing, planning or implementation structures; joint staff activities;
integrated service capacities (e.g. a one-stop entity at the service of network clients);
organization of meetings; definition of the network agenda; the establishment of
ground rules and laying down rules for decision-making (Gray 1989; Kljin 1996;
Jennings and Ewalt 1998; Provan and Sebastian 1998; Shortell et al. 2002; Conrad
et al. 2003; Bazzoli et al. 2003). In public networks for the provision of health and
social services, some of the specific coordination mechanisms that have been
successfully introduced include case management, project management systems for
ongoing care, peer review systems and continuous quality improvement systems.
Personal and informal contact between network partners based on long-lasting
relationships and a high degree of trust has also been shown to have a positive
impact on network performance. The degree of trust is mentioned by many scholars
as a crucial factor that influences relationships within a network and therefore the
network performance, including Ferlie and Pettigrew (1996), and Provan and Kenis
(2008).
3.2 Abilities of the network manager in successful networks
As public network literature gradually developed, scholars left behind the focus on
network structure and mechanisms and started to concentrate on the abilities of the
network manager as predictors of network performance, in the belief that
managerial skills have an impact on network performance (Kickert et al. 1997;
Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Mandell 2001; Huang and Provan 2007; Meier and
O’Toole 2001) and that in some cases they play an even bigger part than the
network structure and mechanisms (Kort and Klijn 2011).
Generally speaking, public network management abilities can be split into two
broad categories: nurturing the network and steering it. Abilities of the former kind
are typical of network ‘‘facilitators’’ and ‘‘mediators’’, while those of the latter kind
are associated with network ‘‘leaders’’ (Agranoff and McGuire 2001, 2003;
McGuire 2002).
In order to nurture the network, the network facilitator/mediator is expected to be
able to foster an environment for a good partner interaction (by creating an
institutional building and establishing working rules to govern partner participa-
tion), promote information exchanges between network partners, maintain harmony
and develop ways to cope with strategic and operational complexity (Kickert et al.
1997; Agranoff and McGuire 2001; O’Toole and Meier 2004). On top of all this, the
facilitator/mediator must be able to ease tension among network members in order
to strengthen their partnerships. This can be done by seeking formal arrangements
through bargaining and negotiations, by reorganizing the network’s structural
processes and by creating governance mechanisms which align the interests of the
partner organizations (Kickert et al. 1997). Ultimately, the network facilitator/
mediator is expected to be able to build commitment to the mission and the goals of
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the network not only among network members but also among external stakeholders
(Agranoff and McGuire 2001). When it comes to steering the network, the network
leader is expected to be able to perform three different tasks: action planning,
activating and re-planning. Action planning consists of establishing clear missions
and developing focused strategies and measures for the network and for the
organization in which the leader works (Agranoff and McGuire 1998; Mitchell et al.
2002). Activating consists of selecting the appropriate players and resources for the
network (Mitchell and Shortell 2000; Agranoff and McGuire 2001, 2003), tapping
the skills, knowledge and resources of others, gaining trust and building consensus
(Agranoff and McGuire 2001). ‘‘Re-planning’’ consists of altering and repositioning
the network objectives when important changes occur in the network environment
(Shortell et al. 2002).
4 Method
On the basis of the abovementioned theoretical framework, our paper aims to
explore whether good performances in shared-governance networks are a result of
coordination mechanisms, the abilities of the network manager, or a specific
combination of coordination mechanisms and managerial abilities.
Due to the exploratory nature of the project, we conducted a multiple case study
(Yin 1984).
4.1 Empirical setting
Public homecare service networks in Switzerland provided the empirical setting for
our study.
We chose Switzerland because it is an information-rich case as far as
collaboration between public, private and non-profit organizations is concerned
(Steiner 2000, 2003). Due to the small size of the Swiss municipalities (only ten of
the 2,516 municipalities have more than 50,000 inhabitants), collaboration for the
provision of public services is in fact a popular approach in the country: more than
60 % of the Swiss municipalities are involved in networks for the joint provision of
public services (Steiner 2000, 2003). We chose, then, homecare networks because
collaboration is most widespread in the health and social field, with 69 % of the
Swiss municipalities involved in networks of this kind (Steiner 2000, 2003).
In early 2000, a federal law (which was followed by a series of cantonal laws)
was issued to induce Swiss municipalities to collaborate when providing health and
social care services at home for the elderly, young families, single parents, disabled
persons or other groups that struggle to cope with their everyday routines. As a
result, ‘‘Spitex organizations’’ were formed (in the form of consortia, foundations or
associations promoted by Swiss Cantons and/or municipalities) to provide services
and support to citizens who need medical aid, care, supervision, monitoring or
advice to increase their capacity for living at home.
Spitex organizations tend to provide some services by themselves and activate
other non-profit organizations to provide ancillary services (such as the
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transportation of disabled clients, meal services for those who are unable to cook,
night-time care, oncological care and psychological support), thus creating a
network of organizations that jointly cater to patients’ needs (hereinafter we will
refer to them as Spitex networks).
The idea behind Spitex networks is that patients should be treated, supported and
advised by specially trained nurses in a familiar environment, so as to increase their
comfort, autonomy and self-determination. Furthermore, providing these services in
the patient’s home is considered to be less cost-intensive than treatment in
stationary facilities like hospitals or nursing homes. These advantages make the
homecare services provided into an essential part of the Swiss health and social care
system.
According to the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (FSO), at present there are
around 575 publicly entrusted Spitex organizations in Switzerland. 540 of them are
in 19 German-speaking cantons with 1,585 municipalities and 5.5 million
inhabitants. A further 1,024 municipalities and 2.4 million inhabitants are covered
by 30 organizations in 6 French-speaking cantons and 6 in the Italian speaking
canton (Swiss Federal Statistical Office 2010). In 2009, Spitex networks served
214,000 patients. 147,000 of them were female (69 %) and the vast majority (75 %)
of patients were older than 64 years of age (ibid.). The total number of patients
amounted to 2.8 % of the Swiss population (ibid.). Spitex networks were able to
provide this 2.8 % of the Swiss population who need social and health care
assistance with services in their homes, meaning that it was not necessary for them
to be treated in stationary facilities like hospitals or nursing homes.
Spitex networks tend to have a variety of structures and forms of governance, as
our previous paper shows (Cristofoli et al. 2011a, b). In addition to networks with a
Lead Spitex Organization that either provides homecare services or activates and
coordinates the network partners, there are networks in which the governance is
shared among all—or most—of the network partners.
This makes Switzerland an interesting empirical setting for a focus on shared-
governance networks and exploration of the factors in their success.
4.2 Case selection
In order to conduct our analysis, we selected four cases using the following criteria
(Table 1): (1) four shared-governance networks; (2) two successful and two
unsuccessful networks; (3) two larger and two smaller networks; (4) two networks
operating in concentrated geographical areas and two networks operating in more
Table 1 Case selection
Geographical concentration Geographical dispersion
Larger networks Spitex-Blu (23) Spitex-Indigo (70)
Smaller networks Spitex-Violet (13) Spitex-Grey (16)
Bold for successful networks
The number of network partners is given in brackets
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widespread areas. This research design allowed us to investigate the impact of
coordination mechanisms and managerial abilities on network performance by
cross-checking them with the network size and geographical concentration, which
are key factors behind the success of shared-governance networks according to the
existing literature (Kenis and Provan 2009). On top of this, all four networks are
mandated and have existed for around ten years. This meant that there was no
variation in the ‘‘exogenous factors’’ which Provan and Kenis (2008) and Kenis and
Provan (2009) claim can affect network performance. In order to guarantee the
anonymity of the selected networks, we will label them as Spitex-Blu, Spitex-
Indigo, Spitex-Violet and Spitex-Grey. There will be a shorter description of Spitex-
Indigo than the other networks because it has already been described in a previous
paper.
The Spitex-Blu network is built around a non-profit association which was set up
to deliver home and social care services to the people of one municipality
(geographical concentration). It is entrusted with the responsibility of providing
homecare assistance by the municipality and when necessary it activates non-profit
organizations to provide complementary services. The resulting network is made up
of approximately 23 partners (network size = 23 partners). The most important
partners—including the municipality, the Spitex organization, and major non-profit
organizations—have established an inner circle which governs the network through
mutual strategic decision-making. The relationships between the players within this
inner circle feature flat hierarchies and a balance of power. There is no single
governing entity within the Spitex-Blu network. Instead, it is governed by a
subgroup of its participants (shared governance).
The Spitex-Indigo network contains approximately 70 organizations (network
size = 70 partners) and was created as a result of a merger between two inter-
municipality consortia that provided services to different geographical areas
(geographical dispersion). As shown in a previous paper (Cristofoli et al. 2011a, b),
Spitex-Indigo is governed by two subgroups which are responsible for providing
Spitex services in two different areas. Therefore, it has a fragmented and horizontal
structure. There is a balance of power between the players within these two
subgroups, which basically mutually define the strategy of the network and the
operational activities (shared governance).
The next network analysed in this study is the Spitex-Violet network. Homecare
assistance in the city of Violet was originally provided by more than 40
organizations operating on a district level (geographical concentration), but during
the 1990s the Violet municipality issued a law that forced the Spitexes to merge. In
the end, only two non-profit associations and one foundation survived. These
Spitexes provide homecare assistance in different districts of the city of Violet and
operate in a highly integrated way under the direction and control of Violet city
council. They work together to make joint strategic decisions, define operating
procedures for service provision and manage joint units offering specific services
(e.g. night-time services, preventive counselling and palliative care services) for the
local community. This approach allows major network partners (i.e. the city, the two
associations and the foundation) to build a strong and cohesive subgroup with
overlapping links. The responsibility for governing the network is shared equally
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among the partners (shared governance). On top of this, the two non-profit
associations and the foundation can get other non-profit organizations to provide
complementary services whenever it is necessary, thus resulting in a relatively small
network with approximately 13 partners (network size: 13 partners).
Finally, the Spitex-Grey network is built around a non-profit association which
provides health and social care services to four municipalities from two Cantons.
The Cantons gave the municipalities the responsibility for organizing the provision
of health and social care services at home. Consequently, the municipalities turned
to a number of associations to provide the services. Spitex-Grey evolved through
mergers between five different Spitex organizations operating in four municipalities
(geographical dispersion). Nowadays, the network has approximately 16 network
partners (network size = 16 partners). The most central network partner mutually
coordinate activities on a strategic level by deliberating and coordinating the
interests of the network members (shared governance).
4.3 Network performance
We used a network’s ability to achieve its expected goals as a measure of network
performance (Provan and Milward 2001).
On the basis of the public assignment of Spitex networks, the federal Spitex
Association formulated guiding principles for every Spitex network in Switzerland.
Spitex networks are asked to treat as many patients as possible, for as long as is
medically possible, in familiar surroundings in order to support and preserve their
autonomy and self-determination by inducing self-help (Spitex-Association 2011).
Building on this, we will take the ratio between the patients served in the year
2010 and the population in the specific Spitex network area during the same year as
a performance indicator. The higher the ratio is, the greater the ability of the
network will be to achieve its expected results. The more patients are served, in fact,
the fewer people will be treated in nursing homes, hospitals and other stationary
facilities, and this is directly related to the abovementioned guiding principles and
objectives.
The data about the patients served in 2010 were taken from the annual reports of
each Spitex-organization, while the data about the populations in each community
in 2010 were based on the information about the residential population in Swiss
municipalities provided by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. Table 2 shows the
performance of each case selected for analysis.
Table 2 Spitex network
performance
Case Performance (%)
Spitex-Blu 1.2
Spitex-Indigo 3.4
Spitex-Violet 2.9
Spitex-Grey 2.2
Swiss average 2.8
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As revealed by Table 2, the performances vary significantly from network to
network. They go from 1.2 % in the case of the Blu network to 3.4 % for the Indigo
network. As mentioned above, the Swiss average is 2.8 %, (Swiss Federal Statistical
Office 2010), so we can say that two of the networks put in a below-average
performance and two networks were above average. While Spitex-Blu (1.2 %) and
Spitex-Grey (2.2 %) displayed a below-average performance, the Spitex-Violet
(2.9 %) and Spitex-Indigo networks (3.4 %) outstripped the average performance in
Switzerland.
4.4 Data collection and analysis
To ensure that the qualitative analysis was reliable (Denzin 1978; Denzin and
Lincoln 1994), different data source and data collection mechanisms were
triangulated. Firstly, we collected data through official documents that were
provided by governments. Secondly, after getting a broad insight into each case, a
questionnaire was given either to the Spitex CEO or, if this person was not
available, to a person working in the management team. The aim of the
questionnaire was to collect information about all of the players involved, their
methods, quality and intensity of collaboration, and the functioning procedures
within the networks and the network management. Thirdly, semi-structured
interviews with the key players in the Spitex networks were conducted. They were
based on the knowledge already acquired thanks to the documentary analysis and
the questionnaire. The interviews allowed further investigation of aspects emerging
from the first two steps and made it possible to gain in-depth knowledge of every
single network. The interviews were conducted either directly at the Spitex-
organization or by telephone and they were transcribed no more than 24 h after each
conversation. In total, there were 25 interviews with key players.
The data were analysed following the three steps of data description, analysis and
interpretation (Miles and Huberman 1994). At the end of the process, relationships
showing the joint impact of the network coordination mechanisms and the abilities
of the network manager on network performance were explored.
5 Findings
Table 3 shows the results of the case study analysis.
As far as coordination mechanisms are concerned, the networks analysed share
some similarities while also presenting important differences. There was no mention
of informal relationships between people that could be found in all four cases, while
the reliance of the four networks on formalized coordination mechanisms also
differed significantly.
In the case of Spitex-Blu, the network partners do not rely on formalized rules to
increase the liability for any decisions that are made. According to the CEO, ‘‘the
task group mentioned is responsible for defining the network’s goals and the
operational activities used to achieve these goals. However, so far we have worked
without any formal agreements.’’ In addition, she mentioned that the reliance on
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formalized rules and mechanisms is very low due to the fact that network meetings
were only introduced recently and formalized network rules had yet to be
established, but the most important players are working on institutionalizing and
formalizing network relationships.
The coordination systems in the other three networks seem to place more of an
emphasis on formalized network rules, contractual agreements and well-organized
network meetings.
The Spitex-Indigo network relies on formalization to a great extent. Decisions are
always made during the general meeting or by the executive committee, ‘‘as
required by law and established in the statute’’ (as quoted in the previous paper).
Therefore, the decision-making process is strictly based on formalized rules.
Furthermore, meetings at all levels of the network are scheduled and well-planned.
Meanwhile, the relationships between the different network partners are defined by
contractual agreements. Accordingly, the relationships between the two subgroups
are regulated by a contract which defines their links and their managerial autonomy.
Similarly, the Spitex-Violet network relies on formalized mechanisms between
the most important network partners in order to be able to guarantee common
ground and unity in certain aspects. The running of the network by the city council
and the two most important Spitex organizations is based on regular network
meetings (six to seven a year), joint decision-making, and contracts defining joint
strategic and operative activities, with the contribution of every player in the
governing subgroup. The CEO of one of the two Spitexes mentioned ‘‘monthly
meetings with the other non-profit Spitex and regular meetings with the city council
and the foundation, as well as regular meetings with our partners, hospitals and
health insurance firms. Doodle is used to set the dates of the meetings.’’ There are
also formal contracts with partner organizations that provide complementary
services, and the various players rely on them a great deal. According to the CEO of
one partner organization, ‘‘the collaboration is based on a contract known as a
‘performance agreement’ and there are meetings two or three times a year.’’
The Grey network relies on formalization to a great extent, as well, and there are
contractual agreements between the key players. The CEO of the Spitex organization
stated that ‘‘contracts are very important for the collaboration between the Spitex, the
Table 3 Results of the case study analysis
Spitex-Blu Spitex-
Indigo
Spitex-Violet Spitex-
Grey
Governance form Shared Shared Shared Shared
Network size Larger Larger Smaller Smaller
Geographical concentration Concentration Dispersion Concentration Dispersion
Reliance on formalized coordination
mechanisms
No Yes Yes Yes
Presence of a distinct network manager No No No No
Presence of network administrators Yes Yes Yes No
Network performance Lower Higher Higher Lower
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municipalities, the Cantons and other non-profit organizations which provide
complementary services.’’ These contracts shape the responsibilities and activities
of each member, as well as the relationships between different members. ‘‘We have
contracts which lay down our competences and responsibilities. These contracts
outline our responsibilities and those of partner XY, and we have to comply with
them.’’ (Spitex-Grey CEO). Furthermore, the meetings for joint decision-making by
partner organizations are well-planned and take place on a regular basis (five times a
year). During these meetings, the content of agreements is discussed and can be altered
if necessary: ‘‘they (the contracts) have to be adjusted once in a while’’. It is possible to
conclude that there is a high degree of formalization within the network and that
formalized network rules are important for network activities on a strategic level.
We were also able to find some similarities and differences in the four cases in
terms of the abilities of the network manager.
The most notable feature of the Spitex-Blu network in this respect is that the
management is left to a widespread group of institutional bodies from different
organizations, which currently maintain the existing rules and procedures, ensure
that the players comply with them and therefore facilitate interaction between
partners. According to the Spitex CEO in fact ‘‘It is a responsibility of the official
bodies of the network partners to discuss strategic goals and increase commitment’’.
The situation in Spitex-Indigo is quite similar. Any disputes among partners are
usually resolved by the governing bodies (the executive committee or general
meeting), without input from the director’s office. As the director said, ‘‘there was
some tension among network partners about the possibility of providing services to
children and poor people as well, but that was a matter for politicians rather than an
issue for the director’’ (as quoted in a previous paper). Furthermore, there is no
specific figure who is able to facilitate interaction between partners, unify interests
or build up the commitment of network members. Everything is coordinated and
discussed in the general and executive committee meetings. Therefore, no clear
network manager could be identified. However, many interviewees identified the
general director, the president and the vice-president of the committee as the main
characters involved in the ‘‘administration’’ of the network.
Just as the responsibility for governing the network is shared equally among three
major network partners in the Spitex-Violet network, there are three main members
who seek to promote interaction between the partners and the smooth running of the
network (the city council and the governing bodies of the two Spitex organizations).
These players—which at the same time constitute the core of the governing
subgroups—endeavour to unify interests, ease tensions, and facilitate collaboration
among network partners. Conflicts are solved by political decisions and interests are
only unified when they are in line with organizational interests. Furthermore, the
city council strives to facilitate collaboration within the inner circle of major partner
organizations, but the success of this mission is dependent on the willingness of
each organization. Consequently, there is no unified network management structure
in the Spitex-Violet network. The following statement by the CEO of one Spitex
organization sums up the situation among the major network members very well:
‘‘The two Spitex governing bodies and the city council form the core strategic
decision-making group in the network. At this level, every partner has a certain
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influence and can bring up its own ideas about future strategic development.’’
Similarly, according to a worker at a Spitex partner: ‘‘The CEO and the board can
work together to define and redefine the objectives and strategic goals for homecare
provision.’’
Spitex-Grey seems to be the only case in which there is neither a person
managing the network, nor an institutional body acting in compliance with the
existing rules and formal agreements. ‘‘There is no member of the network that
coordinates or manages the activities of the different organizations,’’ stated the
Spitex CEO. ‘‘Everything is managed on a strictly contractual basis.’’
6 Discussion and conclusion
The cross-case analysis allows us to give some answers regarding the central
research issue: ‘‘How to be successful in shared-governance networks’’.
Despite their size and geographical concentration, we were able to identify a
pattern of factors behind the high performance levels achieved by the two successful
public networks, namely Spitex-Indigo (3.4 %) and Spitex-Violet (2.9 %). These
shared-governance networks both rely on a well-defined and formalized package of
coordination mechanisms and the simultaneous presence of a group of institutional
bodies to administer them (network administrators). In contrast, the Spitex-Blu
(1.2 %) and Spitex-Grey (2.2 %) networks lack either a reliance on formalized
package of coordination mechanisms or network managers/administrators who can
govern the interaction between the partners in accordance with the existing rules
and procedures.
On the basis of this, it seems possible to argue that the success of shared-
governance networks is ensured by the combination of reliance on formalized
coordination mechanisms and the presence of network administrators (Fig. 2). In
this context, we can theoretically propose that in order to be successful, the more
decentralized a network is, and the more stakeholders there are in the decision-
making processes, the more the network should rely on a well-defined and
formalized package of coordination mechanisms that are implemented by a pool of
network administrators.
We are thus able to make some contributions to public network literature.
Firstly, the results of our study follow the direction suggested by Kenis and
Provan (2009), with exploration of network success in relation to different
Shared-
governance 
network 
Formalized 
coordination 
mechanisms 
& 
Network 
administrators 
High network 
performance 
Fig. 2 How to be successful in shared-governance networks
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governance structures. In particular, by focusing on shared-governance networks,
our work complements the existing studies and shows that network success is not
only affected by the size and geographical concentration of the network.
Management does matter. The reliance on mechanisms to coordinate partner
interaction and the presence of institutional bodies to guarantee compliance with the
existing rules and procedures seems to lead to success, regardless of the conditions
identified by previous studies.
Secondly, the results of our study follow the directions suggested by Turrini et al.
(2010), with exploration of the interdependence of predictors of network perfor-
mance. Coordination mechanisms and the abilities of the network manager (or
rather of the network administrators) seem to have a joint impact with the network
structure on network performance. In particular, coordination mechanisms seem to
mediate the relations between shared governance and network performance.
Regardless of the network size and geographical concentration, the key to network
success seems to be a combination of reliance on formalized coordination
mechanisms and the presence of network administrators. Our paper complements
the results of our previous paper. While the previous paper made us more confident
of the existence of a relationship between the network structure, mechanisms and
management in jointly affecting network success, the current paper allows us to
suppose that a joint impact is made by coordination mechanisms and network
management (at least in shared-governance networks).
Thirdly, the results of the study have examined in greater depth and enriched the
existing literature on the roles and abilities of network managers. The function of
making partner interaction work—which involves various institutional bodies—
cannot be subsumed under the network manager approaches described in the
literature review. It seems that besides the already well-defined managerial
approaches of ‘‘facilitator’’, ‘‘mediator’’ and ‘‘leader’’ (Agranoff and McGuire
2001, 2003; McGuire 2002), there is another approach that is often necessary when
running public networks. We will label it ‘‘the network administrator(s)’’. In
particular, the network administrator(s) can be defined as a group of institutional
bodies which are usually representatives of different organizations. Just like
bureaucrats, they maintain well-defined and formalized coordination mechanisms as
a basis for a procedural decision-making and operating processes. These network
administrators normally follow impersonal, legislated decision-making procedures
so as to preserve a balance of power between the major network partners and thus
give guaranteed stability, accountability and goal attainment in environments
characterized by the presence of various important network partners.
Fourthly, successful shared-governance networks tend to take a more bureau-
cratic approach in order to ensure power-sharing and govern the network according
to established rules and procedures. Thereby, the scope for unilateral managerial
intervention is reduced to a minimum, while the reliance on well-defined and
formalized coordination instruments and mechanisms (such as formalized network
rules, contractual agreements, or well-organized network meetings) becomes a
governing principle. The establishment and maintenance of these coordination
instruments and mechanisms and the establishment of power-sharing within the
network are the main purposes of the network administrators. The results of our
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study raised the never-ending issue of the bureaucratization of public networks. As
described by Bardach (1998), in order to work effectively, shared-governance
networks seem to need a number of features normally associated with hierarchical
organizations. Among them is formalization.
From a managerial point of view, the results of our study seem to provide those
involved in shared-governance networks with some suggestions about how to make
them work: the greater the complexity and involvement of multiple players in
network governance, the more preferable it is to comply with the existing rules and
procedures for partner interaction.
This study is a preliminary step in a wider research project that aims to explore
the joint effects of the predictors of network performance on network success. It
provides us with helpful insights, but it requires further development.
First of all, a quantitative study employing statistical techniques could be a useful
way of testing the proposition. This is the aim of our wider research project.
Secondly, the concept of network performance may need further work and it
might be appropriate to create a composite index that takes its multidimensionality
into account. In particular, in mandatory networks involving public and non-profit
organizations that are labour- and skill/knowledge-intensive like Spitex networks, it
may be useful to examine client wellbeing as compared to measurements such as
QALY (quality-adjusted life years) or quality of daily living.
Thirdly, further insights could come from considering the networks for the
provision of health and social services as professional networks. In this case,
coordination mechanisms, project management systems and managerial mecha-
nisms need to be customized in accordance with the specific demands of labour- and
skill-intensive organizations.
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